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Contracting for liability limitation
lucas bergkamp and michael faure
It has been suggested1 that the market for security services does not
function well because security providers cannot negotiate and obtain
adequate limitation of liability. Due to competition by small firms that
are not concerned about their liability exposure, the larger firms are
effectively forced to assume full liability under the law for damages caused
by their malperformance. In addition, government agencies contract for
security services in accordance with the legal provisions governing public
procurement, and this process does not accommodate negotiations for
limitation of liability of the security provider. Consequently, there could
be a market failure as a result of which security firms are effectively forced
to accept the complete lack of any liability limitations.
This chapter analyses this issue. The first part discusses practices in
other sectors of industry that are exposed to analogous risks of poten-
tially catastrophic damage to determine whether and, if so, to what extent
they limit their liability exposure by contract or other risk management
mechanisms. In the second part, we turn to risk mitigation strategies
that are or could be employed by the economic actors in the security
chain or by other operators exposed to terrorism-related risk. We assess
the effectiveness of risk mitigation mechanisms in potentially reducing
exposure of economic actors in the security chain and other operators to
third-party liability. This analysis seeks to determine which of the mech-
anisms used in other sectors could effectively reduce exposure to liability
for terrorism-related risk. To answer this question, the basic structure of
the security industry and other relevant industries are compared with
the basic structure of the industry sectors discussed in the first part. We
attempt to identify potential restrictions on the possibility to contract
for liability limitation and pay attention to public procurement for secu-
rity products and services, which may not accommodate contracting for
liability limitation. The last section presents our conclusions.
1 Bergkamp, Faure, Hinteregger and Philipsen (eds.) 2013, 268.
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7.1. Industry practices with respect to limitation of liability
7.1.1. Analysis of three specific sectors
In this section, the use of contractual protections (general terms and con-
ditions, etc.) against unlimited liability vis-à-vis third parties in industry
sectors other than the security industry is analysed. Practices in the fol-
lowing three sectors are reviewed:
 software, in particular cybersecurity software;
 pharmaceutical industry; and
 meteorological forecasting.
Risks and practices in each commercial sector will be analysed and pre-
sented in accordance with the following structure:
(1) Nature of potential exposure to risks of large-scale damage (including
scope and historical exposure).
(2) Current industry practices to limit exposure contractually (liability
limitation used in contracts; risk sharing and mutualisation pools;
liability capping and exclusion schemes; and availability, prevalence
and nature of any insurance contracts used).
The sectors of industry analysed in this chapter are exposed to potentially
major liability for damages such as property damage, personal injury,
including medical expenses and disability, pain and suffering (in some
jurisdictions called “moral damage”), environmental damage and eco-
nomic losses (also referred to as “lost profits”). In theory, each sector
could be exposed to claims for each type of damage. Unsafe, defective or
ineffective pharmaceutical products may result in a flood of claims for
personal injury, which could lead to medical expenses, loss of income,
pain and suffering, etc. Defective or ineffective security software could
result in the unavailability of e-commerce websites, resulting in massive
loss of income, or it could provide gateways for “hacking” into computer
systems for managing critical infrastructure, such as nuclear power plants,
which, in turn, could cause a nuclear accident with many casualties, mas-
sive property damage, environmental contamination and enormous loss
of income. Likewise, incorrect meteorological reports could cause mis-
chief for air, maritime and road traffic and result in accidents, personal
injury, property damage, medical expenses and loss of income. Thus, in
terms of the potential for exposure to massive liabilities, the pharmaceu-
tical, software and meteorological industry may be in a position similar
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to the security industry and other operators exposed to terrorism-related
risk. There may be significant differences, however, in terms of the prob-
ability of the risk of actual incidents and the risk of incurring liability
therefore.
With respect to accidents leading to potential liability exposure, the
level of regulation of an industry sector may play a role. Of the sectors
analysed in this chapter, the pharmaceutical industry is the most heavily
regulated, while the other sectors are regulated to a lesser extent. The level
of regulation of the economic actors in the security chain would appear to
be somewhere between the pharmaceutical industry and the other sectors,
although the security-related industry is such a broad category that the
level of regulation very much depends on the specific area. As discussed
in Chapter 2, the level of regulation may have a positive or negative
influence on liability exposure. Extensive regulation does not necessarily
imply reduced liability exposure; regulation may have this effect if it is
effective in reducing the actual risk of accidents. Conversely, it is also
conceivable that onerous but ineffective regulatory standards could result
in increased exposure, where plaintiffs can invoke non-compliance in
support of claims based on negligence.
The actual risk of terrorism is a function of many variables, such as the
political situation, the attractiveness of a target, the level of protection
at the target, the sophistication and specialisation of the terrorists, etc.2
The level of regulation is not likely to be an independent factor but
more likely to reflect the actual or perceived risk of terrorism. If, in
deciding where and when to attack, terrorists conduct a rational cost-
benefit analysis, their decisions would be predictable. Past experience has
shown that attacks targeting means of transportation (airlines, subways,
etc.) are fairly common and tend to occur in large metropolitan centres
(e.g., capital cities). Cyber-attacks, on the other hand, do not appear to
have resulted in the kind of damage at which terrorists aim. Due to this
and other factors, actual risk levels differ substantially from one sector to
another.
Whether companies in a particular sector are able to negotiate contrac-
tual liability limitations and indemnification obligations is a function of
the structure of the market, the main types of customers, their bargaining
power, customs and other factors. There may be substantial differences
between sectors of industry and between individual companies in this
regard. For instance, small companies providing security services may
2 Ibid., 189.
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be willing to accept large liability exposure; large public entities that are
purchasing security goods or services may be in a position to reject any
limitation of liability, etc. The applicable law may also restrict the use
of liability limitation; for example, the Unfair Contract Terms Directive3
does not permit blanket liability limitations that unfairly bias contracts
against consumers. While an exhaustive assessment of these factors is
beyond the scope of this book, some observations on these issues are
made in passing.
7.1.2. Industry practices in other sectors
The actual liability exposure of companies in different sectors of industry
varies due to factors such as the nature of their activities, the physical risk
associated with such activities and, secondarily, the law and regulations
applying to their activities, including the rules on liability. Another rel-
evant factor is industry practice with respect to risk management. The
relevance of these practices to operators and security providers exposed
to terrorism-related risk is considered below. One of the primary consid-
erations in attempting to draw useful parallels is the extent to which the
mechanisms employed by the sectors of industry surveyed can be said to
effectively limit liability within these sectors (i.e. software, pharmaceutical
and meteorological industries).
To limit or exclude liability, the software industry has deployed con-
tractual clauses set forth in an “End User Licensing Agreements” (EULA),
also called “clickwrap agreements”. These clauses effectively limit liability
exposure and deter claims, but they are not enforceable in the European
Union to the extent that they seek to limit consumers’ choice of forum
or court,4 nor to the extent to which they seek to impose a limitation on
liability for personal injury or death and any incidental or consequential
damages arising therefrom under the Unfair Contract Terms Directive.5
The Unfair Contract Terms Directive provides that “[a] contractual term
which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if,
3 Council Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993], OJ L095/29,
(Unfair Contract Terms Directive).
4 Ibid., Article 6 states: “Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the
consumer does not lose protection granted by this Directive by virtue of the choice of the
law of a non-Member country as the law applicable to the contract if the latter has a close
connection with the territory of a Member State.”
5 Ibid., Annex, sections 1(a) and (b).
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contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbal-
ance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to
the detriment of the consumer.”6
Clickwrap agreements fall within the ambit of “not individually nego-
tiated agreements”, a term used in the following provision of the Unfair
Contract Terms Directive: “A term shall always be regarded as not individ-
ually negotiated where it has been drafted in advance and the consumer
has therefore not been able to influence the substance of the term, particu-
larly in the context of pre-formulated standard contracts.”7 The Directive
requires that such contracts do not contain terms that are “unfair” to the
consumer. An illustrative list of terms considered unfair8 includes those
terms which have the object or effect of:
– excluding or limiting the legal liability of a seller or supplier in the event
of the death of a consumer or personal injury to the latter resulting from
an act or omission of that seller or supplier; . . .
– excluding or hindering the consumer’s right to take legal action or
exercise any other legal remedy.9
Many EULAs do not explicitly acknowledge that liability limitations may
not apply in the EU. Some EULAs, however, acknowledge generally the
non-universality of such limitations. For example, a cybersecurity firm’s
limited liability clause excluding “all damages whatsoever” is followed by
an exception stating that “[b]ecause some States do not allow the exclusion
or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages, the above
limitation may not apply to you.”
Where jurisdictions restrict the ability of EULAs to limit liability for
personal injury and incidental or consequential damages, or to specify
a specific court for claims, software companies are effectively forced to
accept the liability exposure or avoid the jurisdiction altogether. The
industry’s current practices to limit exposure, however, to a large extent
remain untested by the courts, and their actual legal effects are in many
cases a matter of speculation. Moreover, where the insurance policies
of software companies provide coverage for damages that are excluded
by EULAs, there is a second layer of protection against potential future
claims.
The question should be asked how it is possible that the software indus-
try has been able to impose liability-limiting contracts on its customers
6 Ibid., Article 3(1). 7 Ibid., Article 3(2). 8 Ibid., Annex 1.
9 Ibid., Annex 1, para 1(a) and (q).
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on an apparently large scale. In this regards, the software industry may be
in a unique position. There are a number of reasons that may help explain
this situation:
(1) Software cannot be held to any objective “safety” or “security” stan-
dards beyond the standard set by its manufacturer. Manifest manu-
facturing defects or design defects may render it obviously unusable
and reasonable consumers expect that even well-functioning soft-
ware contains some “bugs”. It thus is hard to specify objectively what
constitutes a failure of software, or lack of care in developing soft-
ware, given the dynamic nature of the industry and the constantly
evolving security threats to which it must respond. It is indicative
that under the Product Liability Directive, which may or may not
apply to software,10 a producer cannot be held liable where he can
demonstrate that “the state of scientific and technical knowledge at
the time when he put the product into circulation was not such as to
enable the existence of the defect to be detected.”11
(2) The method of sale and delivery of software, which increasingly is
done over the internet, allows for the utilisation of so-called “shrink”
or clickwrap agreements. Linked to this is the respective bargaining
power of both parties. Moreover, it is likely that the price of software
would be dramatically different if software companies could not dis-
claim implied statutory warranties (like functionality and security)
and limit the scope of their prospective liability. All firms in the soft-
ware market are in the same position in this regard and all providers
therefore include liability limitations in their EULAs, thereby nor-
malising the use of these contractual terms and precluding con-
sumers from acquiring these products without acquiescing to these
terms.
(3) The position of contract software service providers may be differ-
ent, however. With regard to the provision of bespoke security ser-
vices for critical infrastructure, the generalised use of exoneration
from liability is unlikely, since it would contradict the specific per-
formance objectives agreed between the parties. Although, due to
the sensitive nature of cybersecurity services for critical infrastruc-
ture, very little information is publicly available, security software
providers may well have cyber liability insurance policies, which offer
protection where direct liability limitation is not possible. Moreover,
10 Stapleton 1994, 334. 11 Unfair Contract Terms Directive, Article 7(e).
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some of the most vulnerable industries are jointly operated with State
agents, which may shield private contractors from sole liability, or
bring them within the scope of sovereign immunity where available.
In Europe, the pharmaceutical industry, to a large extent, remains exposed
to potential third-party liability claims. Strict regulation and pharma-
covigilance procedures and the structure of the civil liability system (no
class actions, etc.), however, may well work to reduce the number of
claims against pharmaceutical companies. Note that regulation in the
area of security does not necessarily produce the same effects. Unlike
economic actors in the security chain, pharmaceutical companies have
had a long history of facing claims and thus developed mechanisms to
protect against such claims, without resorting to exoneration and other
contractual liability limitations.
Again, the nature of the product concerned is key to understanding
the industry’s liability exposure. Pharmaceutical products are regarded
as “inherently” risky; i.e., it is generally acknowledged that the products
pose a certain degree of risk to the user and that the risks may well
vary as a function of the disease to be treated and the physical condition
or susceptibility of the user. The extent to which companies are exposed
when it comes to such risks depends also on the Member State in question.
Germany,for example, imposes strict liability for any risks that are not
pre-identified and cause personal injury to the plaintiff.12 Disclosure of
the risks (specifically, the performance limits) of security products and
services, by contrast, is often either impossible or undesirable. Although
the public understands that these products and services cannot be effective
against each and every attempted terrorist attack, the expectations are
high. If and where security fails and terrorists are able to carry out their
plans, the ensuing damage is not characterised as an “unfortunate side
effect” in the same way as in the case of pharmaceutical products.
With regard to the general user who uses publicly available weather
information, free of charge, the liability-limiting disclaimers employed
by the meteorological industry, in general, are effective in limiting expo-
sure. Alternatively, the meteorological industry can reduce its liability
exposure by carefully describing the services rendered or the standard
that applies to its forecast (e.g., forecasts are provided “as is”, and may
not be accurate, since they are based on predictions based on models). In
cases in which such devices were not deployed by a company, however,
12 German Pharmaceuticals Act (Arzneimittelgesetz; AMG).
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the general standard of care (and, as a related matter, the public’s under-
standing of the unpredictability of the weather and the inherent limits of
weather reports), the lack of foreseeability of harm in a specific case, the
doctrine of risk assumption, the requisite proximate causal link between
the weather report and the plaintiff ’s damage and the plaintiff ’s burden
of proof would help to protect the company concerned against liability.
Although the same standards of liability apply to the economic actors
in the security chain in the event of a terrorist attack, the results may
well be different. The doctrine of risk assumption, for example, is highly
dependent on the specific situation, and victims of a terrorist attack on
an aeroplane may not be deemed to have accepted the risk of scanning
equipment malfunction. The nature of the risk in the meteorological
industry is a natural risk, independent of individual human activity,
while the risk in the security industry is a risk arising from intentional
human behaviour. This difference may well translate into a different level
of exposure of economic actors in the security chain.
To be sure, there are areas and circumstances in which the meteorolog-
ical industry remains vulnerable to liability exposure. Because the meteo-
rological industry predicts event in the future, however, it can invoke the
limits of available models and scientific processes to argue that incorrect
reports are not the result of any fault or negligence. While the ever-
evolving meteorological forecasting modelling may enhance the ability to
predict, at the same time the weather itself may become less predictable.
Moreover, accuracy is increasingly guaranteed by advertised services in
the context of contractual relationships with particular customers.13 In
this sense, an analogy could be drawn with the security industry.
7.1.3. Relevance for the security industry
Each of the three commercial sectors surveyed above exhibits certain spe-
cific characteristics that have influenced the nature of both its liability
exposure and the instruments deployed to limit liability (and their effec-
tiveness). The findings therefore cannot be generalised or extrapolated to
the security industry, which operates in different markets and in different
regulatory and economic contexts. In theory, however, the contractual
mechanisms deployed in these three commercial sectors could be rele-
vant to the economic actors in the security chain. Whether, in practice,
contractual liability limitations can play a significant role is a function of
13 Millington 1987, 238.
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whether such limitations will be accepted by the business partners of the
economic actors in the security chain, and to what extent such limitations
are effective vis-à-vis third parties that have not agreed to them. This, in
turn, is a function of market structure, relative bargaining power, specific
laws and regulations, etc. (Similar reasoning applies also to the possible
deployment of other instruments such as mutual risk pools, which are
discussed in 8.2.) In theory, these arrangements could help, but whether,
in fact, they can be established by and for the benefit of the economic
actors in the security chain given the industry’s specificities and the mar-
ket structure, requires further analysis. Potentially relevant factors may
be whether the industry’s business partners are willing to accept liability
limitations; whether there is sufficient standardisation across the industry
to enable a general standard to be determined; whether the political and
legal context in which the economic actors in the security chain operate
would support liability limitations; which specific structures are most fit-
ting to the industry; and whether other means, or a combination of them,
could achieve the same effect in a more effective, cost-efficient or other-
wise more desirable manner. In short, the analysis of industry practices in
other commercial sectors provides useful insights into how liability risks
can be managed. It demonstrates the respective strengths and weaknesses
of each approach for the relevant industry and highlights the extent to
which particular industry practices in this regard are a product of the
particular needs and experiences of the industry in question.
In the security industry, however, there may be an additional compli-
cation that deserves attention. Contractual mechanisms may be difficult
for the economic actors in the security chain to secure, to the extent con-
tracts are awarded by public procurement based on contracts that are not
negotiable. Public procurement is regulated extensively14 to ensure fair
opportunities and competition, but this law does not require that con-
tractors assume full liability under the law. Of course, where a standard
contract proposed by a purchaser does not provide liability limitations
and a specific bidder insists on such limitations, its chances to be awarded
the contract may be adversely affected (see further under 7.2.2., below).
Sector-wide liability limitations and related mechanisms, in theory, would
14 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February
2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ [2014] L 94/65 and
Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014
on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services
sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC , OJ [2014] L 94/243.
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be an option, but they raise issues under competition law and there is as
yet no evidence of any such attempt in the security industry. It remains
to be seen whether and, if so, how specific tools could be relevant and
workable for economic actors in the security chain in light of industry
practice and market structure, procurement practices and the like.
7.2. Risk mitigation strategies
The analysis presented in previous sections suggests that, when compared
to other sectors, security providers may be less capable of deploying risk
mitigation measures to limit their liability. The reasons for their reduced
ability to limit their liability include the following. First, economic actors
in the security chain, in particular service providers, have argued that
they have been unable to negotiate contractual limitations of their liabil-
ity. Contractual liability limitations can involve (1) narrow descriptions
of primary obligations and limited representations and warranties; (2)
exoneration for certain types of damages, for all damage caused by negli-
gence, or for other types of exposure; (3) liability limitations in the form
of financial caps or similar mechanisms; (4) indemnities; and (5) hybrid
provisions, combinations of or variations on the above. The customers
of the economic actors in the security chain appear to have been able to
impose their terms and conditions on their providers, which has resulted
in a lack of contractual protection for the security providers.15
Second, as discussed, the customers of the security industry are often
public or semi-public authorities, which buy products and services
through a regulated and standardised public procurement process. This
may mean that these customers impose their terms and conditions, which
tend to favour them and that non-acceptance of such terms may disqualify
the bidder. Where this is so, security providers must either accept unlim-
ited liability or the risk of being excluded or disfavoured by purchasers.
For economic and business reasons, companies may not want to forego
this market and thus accept the terms offered.
Third, security providers may not have been able to contract adequate
insurance at a reasonable price to cover the liability risks associated with
terrorism-related risks. Where this is so, they are not insured or underin-
sured for the liability exposure associated with terrorist attacks.
Beyond these considerations, there are broader public policy issues
associated with the civil liability exposure of the security providers. For
15 Bergkamp, Faure, Hinteregger and Philipsen (eds.) 2013, 300.
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instance, should we encourage innovation in security and if so, should we
do so through liability limitations? In light of the differences between secu-
rity providers and other economic actors, these policy questions deserve
further consideration (see Chapter 11).
The position of the security industry in public procurement is not
unique, and other sectors of industry that sell much of their output to
governments may be in a similar position. Nevertheless, the issue requires
further analysis, because security providers may be exposed to larger
liability risks than other sectors and the lack of liability limitations may
thus become a problem.
There is no reliable and representative research on the extent to which
security providers are unable to negotiate limitations on their liability in
contracts with the Member State’s public authorities and governmental
agencies in public procurement for security products and services. It has
been reported, however, that Member State public authorities insist that
security providers remain fully liable under the applicable law.16 Because
there are often one or more bidders willing to accept these conditions
(in particular, smaller companies whose assets are much smaller than
the potential liabilities), all other companies are effectively forced to go
along or they must accept that their chance of being awarded the contract
decrease significantly. In some cases, individual companies have decided
not to participate in bidding because they are not willing to assume the
liability risks.17 It has been reported that companies willing to accept
full liability exposure in the maritime security area are more likely to
offer sub-standard products or services, or have limited assets.18 If, due
to their reluctance to accept unlimited liability risks, financially strong
security providers offering high quality products and services were consis-
tently losing business to financially weak providers offering sub-standard
products and services, this would be a concern. In itself, this would not
necessarily justify a legislative liability limitation, however. In lieu of a
liability limitation, it could possibly provide an argument in favour of
the regulation of security providers, or another measure targeting finan-
cially weak companies.19 In the absence of problems of underdeterrence
of financially weak companies and the “judgment-proof” problem,20 if
16 Ibid., 300. 17 Ibid., 300. 18 Ibid., 300.
19 Such a measure could involve a solvency guarantee in order to avoid externalisation of
insolvency risk.
20 Shavell 1986. This problem arises where the amounts of potential liabilities exceed the
assets of the potentially liable person, so that, to that extent, liability does not create any
financial incentives to prevent harm.
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and to the extent that security providers are “forced” to accept contracts
that do not set any limits to their liability, such contract clauses could
merely reflect the preferences of the Member State governments. Viewed
in this light, any legislative intervention might have adverse consequences.
Under these circumstances, the EU or a national legislature would have
a hard time supporting contractual liability protection for the security
industry, because that would appear to be diametrically opposed to the
Member State governments’ explicit preference for full liability exposure.
The practice of the Member State public authorities to refuse to grant
liability limitations could be consistent with a well-functioning market,
in which security providers decide whether to bid for a specific project
according to the totality of the proposed transaction, including their
liability exposure. There does not appear to be any documentary evidence
of a structural problem that requires legislative intervention in the market.
In the absence of such a problem, the market may simply be competitive
in relation to the ability and willingness of providers to assume liability
risks. In that case, a liability limitation would eliminate competition in
this regard and thus encourage excessive risk-taking, which would result
in higher risk levels.
7.3. Conclusions
The analysis presented in this chapter shows that security providers, unlike
companies in other sectors such as software, may not be able to negoti-
ate limitations on their liability in contracts with their customers. This
appears to be true in particular where the government or public agencies
purchase security services or products in a public procurement process
governed by public procurement legislation.
Although no individual factor discussed above, such as the lack of
contractual liability limitation or adequate insurance coverage, may place
security providers in a unique position with respect to their liability
exposure, it is possible that the combination of factors is unique to the
economic actors in the security chain. For instance, software companies
are potentially exposed to catastrophic liabilities, but they are able to
limit their exposure by contract and to contract adequate insurance,
while security providers are also exposed to catastrophic liabilities, but
are unable to limit their exposure by contract and to contract adequate
insurance. The combination of the exposure to large liabilities (even
if it is based solely on fault) and the inability to limit such exposure by
contract (and to obtain adequate insurance coverage, which, by definition,
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is subject to financial limits) might render security providers uniquely
vulnerable to such liabilities. As noted, none of this means that liability
exposure must therefore be directly limited, but it may mean that there
is possibly exceptional liability exposure that may require policymakers’
attention.
In addressing the liability of the security providers, it is important to
consider not only the difficulties that they may face, but also the objectives
of the liability system. Where liability exposure is excluded or limited, the
realisation of these objectives may be impeded. Accordingly, there must be
important policy reasons to justify an exclusion or limitation of liability,
given the potentially negative effects of such a measure in terms of deter-
rence (prevention), risk allocation and loss-spreading. Moreover, there
are differences between jurisdictions with respect to both liability expo-
sure and the ability to deploy mitigation strategies; some of the arguments
in favour of a liability limitation apply to the liability exposure of the US
security industry and have not the same force in the European liability
environment. In most EU Member States, specific direct compensation
solutions have been worked out to cover damage resulting from terrorist
activities. Indeed, a representative of a large reinsurer said that he was
unaware of any problems with respect to the insurability of the liability
exposure of the security industry in Europe.21 This cautions against the
adoption of any direct measures involving an exclusion or limitation of
the liability of security providers. Measures such as direct State-provided
compensation of damage caused by terrorists, of course, may result in a
de facto limitation of their liability exposure.
21 Bergkamp, Faure, Hinteregger and Philipsen (eds.) 2013, 306.
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